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Identification of Probabilities
Paul M.B. Vita´nyi and Nick Chater
Abstract
Within psychology, neuroscience and artificial intelligence, there has been increasing interest in the
proposal that the brain builds probabilistic models of sensory and linguistic input: that is, to infer a
probabilistic model from a sample. The practical problems of such inference are substantial: the brain
has limited data and restricted computational resources. But there is a more fundamental question: is the
problem of inferring a probabilistic model from a sample possible even in principle? We explore this
question and find some surprisingly positive and general results. First, for a broad class of probability
distributions characterised by computability restrictions, we specify a learning algorithm that will almost
surely identify a probability distribution in the limit given a finite i.i.d. sample of sufficient but unknown
length. This is similarly shown to hold for sequences generated by a broad class of Markov chains,
subject to computability assumptions. The technical tool is the strong law of large numbers. Second, for
a large class of dependent sequences, we specify an algorithm which identifies in the limit a computable
measure for which the sequence is typical, in the sense of Martin-Lo¨f (there may be more than one
such measure). The technical tool is the theory of Kolmogorov complexity. We analyse the associated
predictions in both cases. We also briefly consider special cases, including language learning, and wider
theoretical implications for psychology.
Keywords: learning, Bayesian brain, identification, computable probability, Markov chain, computable
measure, typicality, strong law of large numbers, Martin-Lo¨f randomness, Kolmogorov complexity
I. INTRODUCTION
Bayesian models in psychology and neuroscience postulate that the brain learns a generative proba-
bilistic model of a set of perceptual or linguistic data ([12], [46], [51], [63]). Learning is therefore often
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viewed as an inverse-problem. Some aspect of the world is presumed to contain a probabilistic model,
from which data is sampled; the brain receives a sample of such data, e.g., at its sensory surfaces, and has
the task of inferring the probabilistic model. For example, the brain has to infer an underlying probability
distribution, from a sample from that distribution.
This theoretical viewpoint is implicit in a wide range of Bayesian models in cognitive science, which
capture experimental data across many domains, from perception, to categorization, language, motor
control, and reasoning (e.g., [11]). It is, moreover, embodied in a wide range of computational models
of unsupervised learning in machine learning, computational linguistics, computer vision (e.g., [1], [44],
[65]). Finally, the view that the brain recovers probabilistic models from sensory data is both theoretically
prevalent and has received considerable empirical support in neuroscience ([36]).
The idea that the brain may be able to recover a probabilistic process from a sample of data from that
process is an attractive one. For example, a recovered probabilistic model might potentially be used to
explain past input or to predict new input. Moreover, sampling new data from the recovered probabilistic
model could be used in the generation of new data from that probabilistic process, from creating mental
images [59] or producing language [13]. Thus, from a Bayesian standpoint, one should expect that the
ability to perceive should go alongside the ability to create mental images; and the ability to understand
language should go alongside the ability to produce language. Thus, the Bayesian approach is part of
the broader psychological tradition of analysis-by-synthesis, for which there is considerable behavioural
and neuroscientific evidence with a large amount of evidence, in perceptual and linguistic domains ([48],
[65]).
Yet, despite its many attractions, the proposal that the brain recovers probabilistic processes from
samples of data faces both practical and theoretical challenges. The practical challenges include the fact
that the available data may be limited (e.g., children learn the probabilistic model of highly complex
language using only millions of words). Moreover, the brain faces severe computational constraints: even
the limited amount of data encountered will be encoded imperfectly and may rapidly be lost ([17], [27]).
The brain has limited processing resources to search and test the vast space of possible probabilistic
models that might generate the data available.
In this paper we explore the conditions under which exactly inferring a probabilistic process from a
stream of data is possible even in principle, with no restrictions on computational resources like time
or storage or availability of data. If it turns out that there is no algorithm that can learn a probabilistic
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structure from sensory or linguistic experience when no computational or data restrictions are imposed,
then this negative result will still hold when more realistic settings are examined.
Our analysis differs from previous approaches to these issues by assuming that the probabilistic process
to be inferred is, in a way that will be made precise later, computable. Roughly speaking, the assumption
is that the data to be analysed is generated by a process that can be modelled by a computer (e.g., a
Turing machine or a conventional digital computer) combined with a source of randomness (for example,
a fair coin that can generate a limitless stream of random 0s and 1s that could be fed into the computer).
There are three reasons to suppose that this focus on computable processes is interesting and not overly
restrictive. First, some influential theorists have argued that all physical processes are computable in this,
or stricter, senses (e.g., [20]). Second, most cognitive scientists assume that the brain is restricted to
computable processes, and hence can only represent computable processes (e.g., [55]). According to this
assumption, if it turns out that some aspects of the physical world are uncomputable, these will trivially
be unlearnable simply because they cannot be represented; and, conversely, all aspects of learning of
relevance to psychology, i.e., all aspects of the world that the brain can successfully learn, will be within
the scope of our analysis. Third, all existing models of learning in psychology, statistics and machine
learning are computable (and, indeed, are actually implemented on digital computers) and fall within the
scope of the present results.
A. Background: Pessimism about learnability
Within philosophy of science, cognitive science, and formal learning theory, a variety of considerations
appear to suggest that negative results are likely. For example, in the philosophy of science it is often
observed that theory is underdetermined by data ([21], [53]): that is, in infinite number of theories is
compatible with any finite amount of data, however large. After all, these theories can all agree on any
finite data set, but diverge concerning any of the infinitely large set of possible data that has yet to be
encountered. This might appear to rule out identifying the correct theory—and hence, a fortiori identify
a correct probability distribution.
Cognitive science inherits such considerations, to the extent that the learning problems faced by the
brain are analogous to those of inferring scientific theories (e.g., [26]). But cognitive scientists have also
amplified these concerns, particularly in the context of language acquisition. Consider, for example, the
problem of acquiring language from positive evidence alone, i.e., from hearing sentences of the language,
but with no feedback concerning whether the learners own utterances are grammatical or not (so-called
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negative evidence). It is often assumed that this is, to a good approximation, the situation by the child.
This is because some and perhaps all children receive little useful feedback on their own utterances and
ignore such feedback even when it is given ([7]). Yet, even without negative evidence, children nonetheless
learn their native language successfully. For example, an important textbook on language acquisition [19]
repeatedly emphasises that the child cannot learn restrictions on grammatical rules from experience—and
that these must therefore somehow arise from innate constraints. For example, the English sentences which
team do you want to beat, which team do you wanna beat, and which team do you want to win, which
would seem naturally to imply that *which team do you wanna win is also a grammatical sentence. As
indicated by the asterisk, however, this sentence is typically rejected as ungrammatical by native speakers.
According to classical linguistic theory (e.g., [15]), the contraction to wanna is not possible because it
is blocked by a “gap” indicating a missing subject—a constraint that has sometimes been presumed to
follow from an innate universal grammar [14].
The problem with learning purely from positive evidence is that an overgeneral hypothesis, which does
not include such restrictions, will be consistent with new data; given that languages are shot through with
exceptions and restrictions of all kinds, this appears to provide a powerful motivation for a linguistic
nativism [14]. But this line of argument cannot be quite right, because many exceptions are entirely
capricious and could not possibly follow from innate linguistic principles. For example, the grammatical
acceptability of I like singing, I like to sing, and I enjoy singing would seem to imply, wrongly, the
acceptability *I enjoy to sing. But the difference between the distributional behaviour of the verbs like
and enjoy cannot stem from any innate grammatical principles. The fact that children are able to learn
restrictions of this type, and the fact that they are so ubiquitous throughout language, has even led some
scholars to speak of the logical problem of language acquisition ([3], [30]).
Similarly, in learning the meaning of words, it is not clear how, without negative evidence, the child
can successfully retreat for overgeneralization. If the child initially proposes that, for example, dog refers
to any animal, or that mummy refers to any adult female, then further examples will not falsify this
conjecture. In word learning and categorization, and in language acquisition, researchers have suggested
that one potential justification for over-turning an overgeneral hypothesis is that absence-of-evidence can
sometimes be evidence-of-absence ([32], [28]). That is, a child might take the absence of people using
the word dog when referring to cats or mice; and the absence of Mummy being used to refer to other
female friends or family members might lead to the child to be in doubt concerning their liberal use of
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these terms. But, of course, this line of reasoning is not straightforward—for example, when learning any
category that may apply in an infinite number of situations, the overwhelming majority of these will not
have been encountered. It is not immediately clear how the child can tell the difference between benign,
and genuinely suspicious, absence of evidence. The present results show that there is an algorithm that,
under fairly broad conditions, can deal successfully with overgeneralization with probability 1, given
sufficient data and computation time.
Previous results in the formal analysis of language learnability have reached more pessimistic
conclusions, using different assumptions ([25], [33]). For example, as quoted in [49], the pioneer of
formal learning theory E. M. Gold points that “the problem with [learning only from] text is that if you
guess too large a language, the sample will never tell you you’re wrong” ([25], p. 461). This is true
if we allow very few assumptions about the structure of the text—and indeed negative results in this
area frequently depend on demonstrating the existence of texts (i.e., samples of the language) with rather
unnatural behavior precisely designed to mislead any putative learner. We shall see below that realistic,
though still quite mild, assumptions, are sufficient to yield the opposite conclusion: that probability
distributions, including probability distributions over languages, can be identified from positive instances
alone.
B. Preview and examples
Consider, first, the case of independent, identical draws from a probability distribution. In many areas
of psychology, the learning task is viewed as abstracting some pattern from a series of independent trials
rather than picking up sequential regularities (although the i.i.d. assumption is not necessarily explicit).
The i.i.d. case is relevant to problems as diverse as classical conditioning ([56], where a joint distribution
between conditioned and unconditioned stimuli must be acquired) category learning ([60], where a joint
distribution of category instances and labels is the target), artificial grammar learning or artificial language
learning ([54], [57], where a probability distribution over strings of letters or sounds is to be learned).
Similarly, the i.i.d. assumption is often implicit in learning algorithms in cognitive science and machine
learning, such as, for example, many Bayesian and neural network models in perception, learning and
categorization (e.g., [1])
Learning such potentially complex patterns from examples may seem challenging. Yet even analysing
perhaps the simplest case, learning the probability distribution of a biased coin is not straightforward.
For concreteness, consider flipping a coin, with probability p of coming up heads. Suppose that we can
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flip the coin endlessly, and can, at every point as the sequence of data emerges, guess the value of p; we
can change our mind as often as we like. It is natural to wonder whether there is some procedure for
guessing such that, after some point, we stick to our guess—and that this guess is, either certainly or with
high probability, correct. So, for example, if the coin is a fair coin, such that p = 0.5, will we eventually
lock on to the conjecture that the coin is fair and, after some point, never change this conjecture however
much data we receive?
The answer is by no means obvious, even for such simple case. After all, the difference between the
number of heads and tails will fluctuate, and can grow arbitrarily large—and such fluctuations might
persuade us, wrongly, that the coin is biased in favour, or against, heads. How sure can we be that,
eventually, we will successfully identify the precise bias of a coin that is biased, e.g., where p = 3/4 or
p = 1/3?
Or, to step up the level of complexity very considerable, consider the problem of inferring a stochastic
phrase structure grammar from an indefinitely large sample of i.i.d. sentences generated from that
grammar. 1 Or suppose the input is a sequence of images generated draw from a probabilistic image
model such as a Markov random field—can a perceiver learn to precisely identify the probabilistic model
of the image, given sufficient data?
As we shall see in Section III, below, remarkably, it turns out that, with fairly mild restrictions (a
restricted computability), with probability 1, it is possible to infer in the limit, the correct probability
distribution exactly, given a sufficiently large finite supply of i.i.d. samples. Moreover, it is possible to
specify a computable algorithm that will reliably find this probability distribution. A similar result holds
for ergodic Markov chains, which broadens its application considerably.
This result is unexpectedly strong, given mild restrictions on computability (which we describe in
detail below). In particular, it shows that there is no logical problem concerning the possibility of learning
languages, or other patterns, which contain exceptions, from positive evidence alone. As noted above, it
has been influentially argued in linguistics and the study of language acquisition that exceptions (examples
that are not possible) cannot be learned purely by observing their non-occurrence, because there are, after
all, infinitely many linguistic forms which are possible but also have not been observed (e.g., [19]). A
1A stochastic phrase structure grammar is a conventional phrase structure grammar, with probabilities associated with each of
the rewrite rules. For example, a noun phrase might sometimes expand to give a determiner followed by a noun, while sometimes
expanding to give a single proper noun; and individual grammatical categories, such as proper nouns, map probabilistically on
specific proper nouns.
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variety of arguments and results have suggested that, despite such arguments, languages with exceptions
can be learned successfully ([10], [18], [52]).
The present result shows that with the mentioned restrictions, given i.i.d. data it is possible exactly to
learn the probability distribution of languages from a sample; or, from Markovian outputs, it is possible
exactly to learn the Markov chain involved, and hence, of course, which sentences are acceptable in the
language. An earlier result in [13] showed that language acquisition with sufficient data was possible
on the assumption that an ideal learner could find the shortest description of a corpus. But finding the
shortest description is known to be incomputable. By contrast, the present paper focuses on what can be
learned by a computable learner, provides an explicit algorithm by which that learner can operate, and
considers exact learning rather than approximating the language arbitrarily accurately.
We also consider what can be learned if we weaken the i.i.d. restriction (and the mentioned Markov
chain restriction) considerably—to deal with the possibility of learning sequential data that is generated
by a computable process (we make this precise below). Many aspects of the environment, from the flow
of visual and auditory input, to the many layers of sequential structure relating successive sentences,
paragraphs, and chapters, while reading a novel, are not well approximated by identical independent
sampling from a fixed distribution or the output of a small Markov chain. Nonetheless, the brain appears
to be able to discover their structure, at least to some extent, with remarkable effectiveness.
One particularly striking illustration of the power to predict subsequent input is Shannon’s method for
estimating the entropy of English [58]. Successively predicting the next letter in a text, given previous
letters, one or two guesses often suffice, leading to the conclusion that English texts typically can be
encoded using little more than one bit of information per letter (while more than four bits would be
required if the 26 letters were treated as occurring independently). The ability to predict incoming
sequential input is, of course, important for reacting to the physical or linguistic environment successfully,
by predicting dangers and opportunities and acting accordingly. Many theorists also see finding structure
in sequential material as fundamental to cognition and learning ([16], [22], [29], [35]).
If we weaken the i.i.d. or above Markovian assumption, what alternative restriction on sequential
structure can we impose, and still obtain tractable analytical results? Clearly if there are no restrictions on
structure of the process at all, then there are no constraints between prior and subsequent material. It turns
out, though, a surprisingly minimal restriction is sufficient: we assume, roughly, only that the sequential
material is generated by a mildly restricted computable dependent probabilistic process (this will be
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made precise below). Unlike the i.i.d. or Markov case, different such processes could have generated this
sample; but it turns out that, given a finite sample that is long enough and that is guaranteed to be the
initial segment of an infinite typical output of one of those computable dependent probabilistic processes,
it is possible to infer a single process exactly (out of a number of such processes) according to which
that sample is an initial segment of an infinite typical sample. We shall discuss these issues in Section
IV.
Throughout this paper, we focus on learning probabilities themselves, rather than particular repre-
sentations of probabilities. If there is at least one computer program representing a function, there are,
of course, infinitely many such programs (representing the data in slightly different ways, incorporating
additional null operations, and so on). The same is true for programs representing probability distributions.
For some purposes, these differences in representation may be crucial. For example, psychologists and
linguists may be interested in which of an infinite number of equivalent grammars—from the point of
view of the sentences allowed—is represented by the brain. But, from the point of view of the problem
of learning, we must treat them as equivalent. Indeed, it is clear that no learning method of probabilities
alone could ever distinguish between models which generate precisely the same probability distribution
over possible observations.
Our discussion begins with an introduction of our formal framework, in the next section. We then turn
to the case of i.i.d. draws from a computable mass function, and to runs of a computable ergodic Markov
chain, using the strong law of large numbers as the main technical tool. The next section Computable
Measures considers learning material with computable sequential dependencies; here the main technical
tool is Kolmogorov complexity theory. We then briefly consider whether these results have implications
for the problem of prediction future data, based on past data, before we draw brief conclusions. The
mathematical details and detailed proofs are relegated to Appendices.
II. THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK
We follow in the general theoretical tradition of formal learning theory, where we abstract away from
specific representational questions, and focus on the underlying abstract structure of the learning problem.
One can associate the natural numbers with a lexicographic length-increasing ordering of finite strings
over a finite alphabet. A natural number corresponds to the string of which it is the position in the thus
established order. Since a language is a set of sentences (finite strings over a finite alphabet), it can be
viewed as a subset of the natural numbers. (In the same way, natural numbers could be associated with
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images or instances of a concept). The learnability of a language under various computational assumptions
is the subject of an immensely influential approach in [24] and especially [25], or the review [33]. But
surely in the real world the chance of one sentence of a language being used is different from another
one. For example, in general short sentences have a larger chance of turning up than very long sentences.
Thus, the elements of a given language are distributed in a certain way. There arises the problem of
identifying or approximating this distribution.
Our model is formulated as follows: we are given an sufficiently long finite sequence of data consisting
of elements drawn from the set (language) according to a certain probability, and the learner has to identify
this probability. In general, however much data been encountered, there is no point at which the learner
can announce a particular probability as correct with certainty. Weakening the learning model, the learner
might learn to identify the correct probability in the limit. That is, perhaps the learner might make a
sequence of guesses, finally locking on to correct probability and sticking to it forever—even though
the learner can never know for sure that it has identified the correct probability successfully. We shall
consider identification in the limit (following, for example, [25], [33], [49]). Since this is not enough we
additionally restrict the type of probability.
In conventional statistics, probabilistic models are typically idealized as having continuous valued
parameters; and hence there is an uncountable number of possible probabilities. In general it is impossible
that a learner can make a sequence of guesses that precisely locks on to the correct values of continuous
parameters. In the realm of algorithmic information theory, in particular in Solomonoff induction [61]
and here, we reason as follows. The possible strategies of learners are computable in the sense of
Turing [64], that is, they are computable functions. The set of these is discrete and thus countable. The
hypotheses that can be learned are therefore countable, and in particular the set of probabilities from
which the learner chooses must be computable. Indeed, this argument can be interpreted as showing that
the fundamental problem is one of representation: the overwhelming majority of real-valued parameters
cannot be represented by any computable strategy; and hence a fortiori cannot possible be learned.
Our starting point is that it is only of interest to consider the identifiability of computable hypotheses—
because hypotheses that are not computable cannot be represented, let alone learned. Making this precise
requires specifying what it means for a probability distribution to be computable. Moreover, it turns out
that computability is not enough, it is also necessary that the considered set of computable probabilities
is computably enumerable (c.e.) and co-computable enumerable (co-c.e.) sets, all of which are explained
9
in the Appendix A. Informally, a subset of a set is c.e. if there is a computer which enumerates all the
elements of the subset but no element outside the subset (but in the set). For example, the computable
probability mass functions (or computable measures) for which we know algorithms computing them can
be computably enumerated in lexicographic order of the algorithms. Hence they satisfy Theorem 1 (or
Theorem 2.
A subset is co-c.e. if all elements outside the subset (but in the set) can be enumerated by a computer.
In our case the set comprises all computable probability mass functions, respectively, all computable
measures. Since by Lemma 1 in Appendix A this set is not c.e. a subset that is c.e. (or co-c.e.) is a
proper subset, that is, it does not contain all computable probability mass functions, respectively, all
computable measures.
In the exposition below, we consider two cases. In case 1 the data are drawn independent identically
distributed (i.i.d.) from a subset of the natural numbers according to a probability mass function in a c.e.
or co-c.e. set of computable probability mass functions, or consist of a run of a member of a c.e. or co-c.e.
set of computable ergodic Markov chains. For this case, there is, as we have noted, a learning algorithm
that will almost surely identify a probability distribution in the limit. This is the topic of Section III,
below.
In case 2 the elements of the infinite sequence are dependent and the data sequence is typical for
a measure from a c.e. or co-c.e. set of computable measures. For this more general case, we prove a
weaker, though still surprising result: that there is an algorithm which identifies in the limit a computable
measure for which that sequence is typical (in the sense introduced by Martin-Lo¨f). These results are the
focus of Section IV, below.
A. Preliminaries
Let N , Q, R, and R+ denote the natural numbers, the rational numbers, the real numbers, and the
nonnegative real numbers, respectively. We say that we identify a function f in the limit if we have an
algorithm which produces an infinite sequence f1, f2, . . . of functions and fi = f for all but finitely many
i. This corresponds to the notion of “identification in the limit” in [25], [33], [49], [66]. In this notion at
every step an object is produced and after a finite number of steps the target object is produced at every
step. However, we do not know this finite number. It is as if you ask directions and the answer is “at the
last intersection turn right,” but you do not know which intersection is last. The functions f we want to
identify in the limit are probability mass functions, Markov chains, or measures.
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DEFINITION 1: Let L ⊆ N and its associated probability mass function p a function p : L → R+
satisfying
∑
x∈L p(x) = 1. A Markov chain is an extension as in Definition 2. A measure µ is a function
µ : L∗ →R+ satisfying the measure equalities in Appendix C.
B. Related work
In [2] (citing previous more restricted work) a target probability mass function was identified in the
limit when the data are drawn i.i.d. in the following setting. Let the target probability mass function p be
an element of a list q1, q2, . . . subject to the following conditions: (i) every qi : N → R+ is a probability
mass function; (ii) we exhibit a computable total function C(i, x, ǫ) = r such that qi(x) − r ≤ ǫ with
r, ǫ > 0 are rational numbers. That is, there exists a rational number approximation for all probability
mass functions in the list up to arbitrary precision, and we give a single algorithm which for each such
function exhibits such an approximation. The technical means used are the law of the iterated logarithm
and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. However, the list q1, q2, . . . can not contain all computable probability
mass functions because of a diagonal argument, Lemma 1.
In [4] computability questions are apparently ignored. The Conclusion states “If the true density [and
hence a probability mass function] is finitely complex [it is computable] then it is exactly discovered
for all sufficiently large sample sizes.”. The tool that is used is estimation according to minq(L(q) +
log(1/
∏n
i=1 q(Xi)). Here q is a probability mass function, L(q) is the length of its code and q(Xi)
is the q-probability of the ith random variable Xi. To be able to minimize over the set of computable
q’s, one has to know the L(q)’s. If the set of candidate distributions is countably infinite, then we can
never know when the minimum is reached—hence at best we have then identification in the limit. If
L(q) is identified with the Kolmogorov complexity K(q), as in Section IV of this reference, then it is
incomputable as already observed by Kolmogorov in [39] (for the plain Kolmogorov complexity; the
case of the prefix Kolmogorov complexity K(q) is the same). Computable L(q) (given q) cannot be
computably enumerated; if they were this would constitute a computable enumeration of computable q’s
which is impossible by Lemma 1. To obtain the minimum we require a computable enumeration of the
L(q)’s in the estimation formula. The results hold (contrary to what is claimed in the Conclusion of [4]
and other parts of the text) not for the set of computable probability mass functions since they are not
c.e.. The sentence “you know but you don’t know you know” on the second page of [4] does not hold
for an arbitrary computable mass probability.
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In reaction to an earlier version of this paper with too large claims as described in Appendix E, in [6] it
is shown that it is impossible to identify an arbitrary computable probability mass function (or measure)
in the limit given an infinite sequence of elements from its support (which sequence is guarantied to be
typical for some computable measure in the measure case).
C. Results
The set of halting algorithms for computable probabilities (or measures) is not c.e., Lemma 1 in
Appendix A. This complicates the algorithms and analysis of the results. In Section III there is a
computable probability mass function (the target) on a set of natural numbers. We are given a sufficiently
long finite sequence of elements of this set that are drawn i.i.d. and are asked to identify the target.
An algorithm is presented which identifies the target in the limit almost surely provided the target
is an element of a c.e. or co-c.e. set of halting algorithms for computable probability mass functions
(Theorem 1). This also underpins the result announced in [31, Theorem 1 in the Appendix and appeals
to it in the main text of the reference] with the following modification “computable probabilities” need
to be replaced by “c.e. and co-c.e. sets of computable probabilities”. If the target is an element of a
c.e. or co-c.e. set of computable ergodic Markov chains then there is an algorithm with as input a
sequence of states of a run of the Markov chain and as output almost surely the target (Corollary 1).
The technical tool is in both cases the strong law of large numbers. In Section IV the set of natural
numbers is also infinite and the elements of the sequence are allowed to be dependent. We are given
a guaranty that the sequence is typical (Definition 4) for at least one measure from a c.e. or co-c.e.
set of halting algorithms for computable measures. There is an algorithm which identifies in the limit
a computable measure for which the data sequence is typical (Theorem 2). The technical tool is the
Martin-Lo¨f theory of sequential tests [45] based on Kolmogorov complexity. In Section V we consider
the associated predictions, and in Section VI we give conclusions. In Appendix A we review the used
computability notions, in Appendix B we review notions of Kolmogorov complexity, in Appendix C we
review the used measure and computability notions. We defer the proofs of the theorems to Appendix D.
In Appendix E we give the tortuous genesis of the results.
III. COMPUTABLE PROBABILITY MASS FUNCTIONS AND I.I.D. DRAWING
To approximate a probability in the i.i.d. setting is well-known and an easy example to illustrate our
problem. One does this by an algorithm computing the probability p(a) in the limit for all a ∈ L ⊆ N
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almost surely given the infinite sequence x1, x2, . . . of data i.i.d. drawn from L according to p. Namely, for
n = 1, 2, . . . for every a ∈ L occurring in x1, x2, . . . , xn set pn(a) equal to the frequency of occurrences
of a in x1, x2, . . . , xn. Note that the different values of pn sum to precisely 1 for every n = 1, 2, . . . . The
output is a sequence p1, p2, . . . of probability mass functions such that we have limn→∞ pn = p almost
surely, by the strong law of large numbers (see Claim 1). The probability mass functions considered here
consist of all probability mass functions on L—computable or not. The probability mass function p is
thus represented by an approximation algorithm.
In this paper we deal only with computable probability mass functions. If p is computable then it
can be represented by a halting algorithm which computes it as defined in Appendix A. Most known
probability mass functions are computable provided their parameters are computable. In order that it
is computable we only require that the probability mass function is finitely describable and there is a
computable process producing it [64].
One issue is how short the code for p is, a second issue are the computability properties of the code for
p, a third issue is how much of the data sequence is used in the learning process. The approximation of p
above results in a sequence of codes of probabilities p1, p2, . . . which are lists of the sample frequencies
in an initial finite segment of the data sequence. The code length of the list of frequencies representing
pn grows usually to infinity as the length n of the segment grows to infinity. The learning process
involved uses all of the data sequence and the result is an encoding of the sample frequencies in the data
sequence in the limit. The code for p is usually infinite. This holds as well if p is computable. Such an
approximation contrasts with identification in the following.
THEOREM 1: I.I.D. COMPUTABLE PROBABILITY IDENTIFICATION Let L be a set of natural numbers
and p be a probability mass function on L. This p is described by an element of a c.e. or co-c.e. set of
halting algorithms for computable probability mass functions. There is an algorithm identifying p in the
limit almost surely from an infinite sequence x1, x2, . . . of elements of L drawn i.i.d. according to p.
The code for p via an appropriate Turing machine is finite. The learning process uses only a finite initial
segment of the data sequence and takes finite time.
We do not know how large the finite items in the theorem are. The proof of the theorem is deferred to
Appendix D. The intuition is as follows. By assumption the target probability mass function is a member
of a linear list of halting algorithms for computable probability mass functions listed as list A. By the
strong law of large numbers we can approximate the target probability mass function by the sample
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means. Since the members of A are linearly ordered we can after each new sample compute the least
member which agrees best according to a certain criterion with the samples produced thus far. At some
stage this least element does not change any more.
EXAMPLE 1: Since the c.e. and co-c.e. sets strictly contain the computable sets, Theorem 1 is strictly
stronger than the result in [2] referred to in Section II-B. It is also strictly stronger than [4] that does not
give identification in the limit for classes of computable functions.
Define the primitive computable probability mass functions as the set of probability mass functions
for which it is decidable that they are constructed from primitive computable functions. Since this set is
computable it is c.e.. The theorem shows that identification in the limit is possible for members of this
set. Define the time-bounded probability mass functions for any fixed computable time bound as the set
of elements for which it is decidable that they are computable probability mass functions satisfying this
time bound. Since this set is computable it is c.e.. Again, the theorem shows that identification in the
limit is possible for elements from this set.
Another example is as follows. Let L = {a1, a2, . . . , an} be a finite set. The primitive recursive
functions f1, f2, . . . are c.e.. Hence the probability mass functions p1, p2, . . . on L defined by pi(aj) =
fi(j)/
∑n
h=1 fi(h) are also c.e.. Let us call these probability mass functions simple. By Theorem 1 they
can be identified in the limit. ♦
The class of probability mass functions for which the present result applies is very broad. Suppose, for
example, that we frame the problem of language acquisition in the following terms: a corpus is created by
i.i.d. sampling from some primitive recursive language generation mechanism (for example, a stochastic
phrase structure grammar [9] with rational probabilities, or an equivalent, but more cognitively motivated
formalism such as tree-adjoining grammar [34] or combinatory categorical grammar [62]). That is, the
algorithm described here will search possible programs which correspond to generators of grammars, and
will eventually find, and never change from, a stochastic grammar that precisely captures the probability
mass function that generated the linguistic data. That is, the present result implies that there is a learning
algorithm that identifies in the limit the probability mass function according to which these sentences
are generated with probability 1. Of course, there may, in general, within any reasonably rich stochastic
grammar formalism, be many ways of representing the probability distribution over possible sentences
(just as there are many computer programs that code for the same function). Of course, no learning
process can distinguish between these, precisely because they are, by assumption, precisely equivalent in
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their predictions. Hence, an appropriate goal of learning can only be to find the underlying probability
mass function, rather than attempting the impossible task of inferring the particular representation of that
function.
The result applies, of course, not just to language but to learning structure in perceptual input, such as
visual images. Suppose that a set of visual images is created by i.i.d sampling from a Markov random
field with rational parameters [43]; then there will be a learning algorithm which identifies in the limit the
probability distribution over these images with probability 1. The result applies, also, to the unsupervised
learning of environmental structure from data, for example by connectionist learning methods [1] or by
Bayesian learning methods ([12], [47], [63]).
A. Markov chains
I.i.d. draws from a probability mass function is a special case of a run of a discrete Markov chain.
We investigate which Markov chains have an equivalent of the strong law of large numbers. Theorem 1
then holds mutatis mutandis for these Markov chains. First we need a few definitions.
DEFINITION 2: A sequence of random variables (Xt)
∞
t=0 with outcomes in a finite or countable state
space S ⊆ N is a discrete time-homogeneous Markov chain if for every ordered pair i, j of states
the quantity qi,j = Pr(Xt+1 = j|Xt = i) called the transition probability from state i to state j, is
independent of t. If M is such a Markov chain then its associated transition matrix Q is defined as
Q := (qi,j)i,j∈N . The matrix Q is non-negative and its row sums are all unity. It is infinite dimensional
when the number of states is infinite.
In the sequel we simply speak of “Markov chains” and assume they satisfy Definition 2.
DEFINITION 3: A Markov chain M is ergodic if it has a stationary distribution π = (πx)x∈S satisfying
πQ = π and for every distribution σ 6= π holds σQ 6= σ. This stationary distribution π satisfies πx > 0
for all x ∈ S and ∑x∈S πx = 1. With Xt being the state of the Markov chain at epoch t starting from
X0 = x0 ∈ S we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
Xt = Epi[X] =
∑
x∈S
πxx, (III.1)
approximating theoretical means by sample means. An ergodic Markov chain is computable if its transition
probabilities and stationary distribution are computable.
COROLLARY 1: IDENTIFICATION COMPUTABLE ERGODIC MARKOV CHAINS Consider a c.e. or co-
c.e. set of halting algorithms for computable ergodic Markov chains. Let M be an element of this set.
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There is an algorithm identifying M in the limit almost surely from an infinite sequence x1, x2, . . . of
states of M produced by a run of M . The code for M via an appropriate Turing machine is finite. The
learning process uses only a finite initial segment of the data sequence and takes finite time.
EXAMPLE 2: Let M be an ergodic Markov chain with a finite set S of states. There exists a unique
distribution π over S with strictly positive probabilities such that
lim
s→∞
qsi,j = πj,
for all states i and j. In this case we have that π0Qt → π pointwise as t→∞ and the limit is independent
of π0. The stationary distribution π is the unique vector satisfying πQ = π, where
∑
i πi = 1. (Necessary
and sufficient conditions for ergodicity are that the chain should be irreducible, that is for each pair of
states i, j there is an s ∈ N such that qsi,j > 0 (state j can be reached from state i in a finite number of
steps); and aperiodic, the gcd{s : qsi,j > 0} = 1 for all i, j ∈ T .
Equation πQ = π is a system of N linear equations in N unknowns (the entries πj). We can solve the
unknowns by elimination of variables: in the first equation express one variable in terms of the others;
substitute the expression into the remaining equations; repeat this process until the last equation; solve
it and then back substitute until the total solution is found.
Since π is unique the system of linear equations has a unique solution. If the original entries of Q
are computable, then this process keeps the entries of π computable as well. Therefore, if the transition
probabilities of the Markov chain are computable, then the stationary distribution π is a computable
probability mass function. We now invoke the Ergodic Theorem approximating theoretical means by
sample means [23], [40] as in (III.1). ♦
IV. COMPUTABLE MEASURES
In the i.i.d. case we dealt with a process where the future was independent of the present or the
past, in the Markov case we extended this independence such that the immediate future is determined
by the present but not by the past of too long ago. What can be shown if we drop the assumption of
independence altogether? Then we go to measures as defined in Appendix C. As far as the authors are
aware, for general measures there exist neither an approximation as in Section III nor an analog of the
strong law of large numbers. However, there is a notion of typicality of an infinite data sequence for a
computable measure in the Martin-Lo¨f theory of sequential tests [45] based on Kolmogorov complexity,
and this is what we use.
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Let L ⊆ N and µ be a measure on L∞ in a c.e. or co-c.e. set of halting algorithms for computable
measures. In this paper instead of the common notation µ(Γx) we use the simpler notation µ(x). We are
given a sequence in L∞ which is typical (Definition 4 in Appendix C) for µ. The constituent elements
of the sequence are possibly dependent. The set of typical infinite sequences of a computable measure
µ have µ-measure one, and each typical sequence passes all computable tests for µ-randomness in the
sense of Martin-Lo¨f. This probability model is much more general than i.i.d. drawing according to a
probability mass function. It includes stationary processes, ergodic processes, Markov processes of any
order, and many other models. In particular, this probability model includes many of the models used in
mathematical psychological and cognitive science.
THEOREM 2: COMPUTABLE MEASURE IDENTIFICATION Let L be a set of natural numbers. We are
given an infinite sequence of elements from L and this sequence is guarantied to be typical for at least
one measure in a c.e. or co-c.e. set of halting algorithms for computable measures. There is an algorithm
which identifies in the limit (certainly) a computable measure in the c.e. or co-c.e set above for which the
sequence is typical. The code for this measure is an appropriate Turing machine and finite. The learning
process takes finite time and uses only a finite initial segment of the data sequence.
The proof is deferred to Appendix D. 2 We give an outline of the proof of Theorem 2. Let B be a list
of a c.e. or co-c.e. set of halting algorithms for computable measures. Assume that each measure occurs
infinitely many times in B. For a measure µ in the list B define
σ(j) = log 1/µ(x1 . . . xj)−K(x1 . . . xj).
By (A.2) in Appendix C, data sequence x1, x2, . . . is typical for µ iff supj σ(j) = σ <∞. By assumption
there exists a measure in B for which the data sequence is typical. Let µh be such a measure. Since
halting algorithms for µh occur infinitely often in the list B there is a halting algorithm µh′ in the list B
with σh′ = σh and σh < h
′. This means that there exists a measure µk in B for which the data sequence
x1, x2, . . . is typical and σk < k with k least.
EXAMPLE 3: Let us look at some applications. Define the primitive recursive measures as the set of
objects for which it is decidable that they are measures constructed from primitive recursive functions.
2 Theorem 2 and Theorem 1 are incomparable although it is tempting to think the latter is a corollary of the former. The
infinite sequences considered in Theorem 2 are typical for some computable measure. Restricted to i.i.d. measures (the case of
Theorem 1) such sequences are a proper subset from those resulting from i.i.d. draws from the corresponding probability mass
function. This is the reason why the result of Theorem 2 is “certain” and the result from Theorem 1 is “almost surely.”
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Since this set is computable it is c.e.. The theorem shows that identification in the limit is possible for
primitive recursive measures.
Define the time-bounded measures for any fixed computable time bound as the set of objects for which
it is decidable that they are measures satisfying this time bound. Since this set is computable it is c.e..
Again, the theorem shows that identification in the limit is possible for elements from this set.
Let L be a finite set of cardinality l, and f1, f2, . . . be a c.e. set of the primitive recursive functions with
domain L. Computably enumerate the strings x ∈ L∗ lexicographical length-increasing. Then every string
can be viewed as the integer giving its position in this order. Let ǫ denote the empty word, that is, the
string of length 0. Confusion with the notation ǫ equals a small quantity is avoided by the context. Define
µi(ǫ) = fi(ǫ)/fi(ǫ) = 1, and inductively for x ∈ L∗ and a ∈ L define µi(xa) = fi(xa)/
∑
a∈L fi(xa).
Then µi(x) =
∑
a∈L µi(xa) for all x ∈ L∗. Therefore µi is a measure. Call the c.e. set µ1, µ2, . . . the
simple measures. The theorem shows that identification in the limit is possible for the set of simple
measures. ♦
V. PREDICTION
In Section III the data are drawn i.i.d. according to an appropriate probability mass function p on the
elements of L. Given p, we can predict the probability p(a|x1, . . . , xn) that the next draw results in an
element a when the previous draws resulted in x1, . . . , xn. (The resulting measure on L
∞ is called an i.i.d.
measure.) Once we have identified p, prediction is possible (actually after a finite but unknown running
time of the identifying algorithm). The same holds for a ergodic Markov chains (Corollary 1). This is
reassuring for cognitive scientists and neuroscientists who see prediction as fundamental to cognition
([16], [22], [29], [35]).
For general measures as in Section IV, allowing dependent data, the situation is quite different. We
can meet the so-called black swan phenomenon of [50]. Let us give a simple example. The data sequence
is a, a, . . . is typical (Definition 4) for the measure µ1 defined by µ1(x) = 1 for every data sequence x
consisting of a finite or infinite string of a’s and µ1(x) = 0 otherwise. But a, a, . . . is also typical for the
measure µ0 defined by µ0(x) =
1
2
for every string x consisting of a finite or infinite string of a’s, and
µ0(x) =
1
2
for a string x consisting of initially a fixed number n of a’s followed by a finite or infinite
string of b’s, and 0 otherwise. Then, µ1 and µ0 give different predictions with an initial n-length sequence
of a’s. But given a data sequence consisting initially of only a’s, a sensible algorithm will predict a as
the most likely next symbol. However, if the initial data sequence consists of n symbols a, then for µ1
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the next symbol will be a with probability 1, and for µ0 the next symbol is a with probability
1
2
and
b with probability 1
2
. Therefore, while the i.i.d. case allows us to predict reliably, in the dependent case
there is in general no reliable predictor for the next symbol. In [5], however, Blackwell and Dubin show
that under certain conditions predictions of two measures merge asymptotically almost surely.
VI. CONCLUSION
Many psychological theories see learning from data, whether sensory or linguistic, as a central function
of the brain. Such learning faces great practical difficulties—the space of possible structures is very
large and difficult to search, and the computational power of the brain is limited, and the amount of
available data may be limited. But it is not clear under what circumstances such learning is possible even
with unlimited data and computational resources. Here we have shown that, under surprisingly general
conditions, some positive results about identification in the limit in such contexts can be established.
Using an infinite sequence of elements (or a finite sequence of large enough but unknown length) from
a set of natural numbers, algorithms are exhibited that identify in the limit the probability distribution
associated with this set. This happens in two cases. (i) The underlying set is countable and the target
distribution is a probability mass function (i.i.d. measure) in a c.e. or co-c.e. set of computable probability
mass functions. The elements of the sequence are drawn i.i.d. according to this probability (Theorem 1).
This result is extended to computable ergodic Markov chains (Corollary 1). (ii) The underlying set is
countable and the infinite sequence is possibly dependent and is typical for a computable measure in a
c.e. or co-c.e. set of computable measures (Theorem 2).
In the i.i.d. case and the ergodic Markov chain case the target is identified in the limit almost surely,
and in the dependent case the target computable measure is identified in the limit surely—however it is
not unique but one out of a set of satisfactory computable measures. In the i.i.d. case and Markov case
we use the strong law of large numbers. For the dependent case we use typicality according to the theory
developed by Martin-Lo¨f in [45] embedded in the theory of Kolmogorov complexity.
In both the i.i.d., the Markovian, and the dependent settings, eventually we guess an index of the
target (or one target out of some possible targets in the measure case) and stick to this guess forever.
This last guess is correct. However, we do not know when the guess becomes permanent. We use only a
finite unknown-length initial segment of the data sequence. The target for which the guess is correct is
described by a an appropriate Turing machine computing the probability mass function, Markov chain,
or measure, respectively.
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These results concerning algorithms for identification in the limit consider what one might term the
“outer limits” of what is learnable, by abstracting away from computational restrictions and a finite
amount of data available to human learners. Nonetheless, such general results may be informative when
attempting to understand what is learnable in more restricted settings. Most straightforwardly, that which
is not learnable in the unrestricted case will, a fortiori, not be learnable when computational or data
restrictions are added. It is also possible that some of the proof techniques used in the present context
can be adapted to analyse more restricted, and hence more cognitively realistic, settings.
APPENDIX
A. Computability
We can interpret a pair of integers such as (a, b) as rational a/b. A real function f with rational
argument is lower semicomputable if it is defined by a rational-valued computable function φ(x, k) with
x a rational number and k a nonnegative integer such that φ(x, k + 1) ≥ φ(x, k) for every k and
limk→∞ φ(x, k) = f(x). This means that f can be computably approximated arbitrary close from below
(see [42], p. 35). A function f is upper semicomputable if −f is semicomputable from below. If a real
function is both lower semicomputable and upper semicomputable then it is computable. A function
f : N → R+ is a probability mass function if ∑x f(x) = 1. It is customary to write p(x) for f(x) if
the function involved is a probability mass function.
A set A ⊆ N is computable enumerable (c.e.) when we can compute the enumeration a1, a2, . . . with
ai ∈ A (i ≥ 1). A c.e. set is also called recursively enumerable (r.e.). A co-c.e. set B ⊆ N is a set
whose complement N \B is c.e.. (A set is c.e. iff it is at level Σ01 of the arithmetic hierarchy and it is
co-c.e. iff it is at level Π01.) If a set is both c.e. and co-c.e. then it is computable. A halting algorithm for
a computable function f : N → R is an algorithm which given an argument x and any rational ǫ > 0
computes a total computable rational function fˆ : N ×Q → Q such that |f(x)− fˆ(x, ǫ)| ≤ ǫ.
EXAMPLE 4: We give an example of the relation between co-c.e. and identification in the limit.
Consider a c.e. set A of objects and the co-c.e. set B such that N \B = A. We call the members of B
the good objects and the members of A the bad objects. We do not know in what order the bad objects
are enumerated or repeated; however we do know that the remaining items are the good objects. These
good objects with possible repetitions form the enumeration B. It takes unknown time to enumerate an
initial segment of B, but we are sure this happens eventually. Hence to identify the kth element in the
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enumeration B requires identification of the first 1, . . . , k− 1 elements. This constitutes identification in
the limit. ♦
EXAMPLE 5: It is known that the overwhelming majority of real numbers are not computable. If a
real number a is lower semicomputable but not computable, then we can computably find nonnegative
integers a1, a2, . . . and b1, b2, . . . such that an/bn ≤ an+1/bn+1 and limn→∞ an/bn = a. If a is the
probability of success in a trial then this gives an example of a lower semicomputable probability mass
function which is not computable. ♦
Suppose we are concerned with all and only computable probability mass functions. There are countably
many since there are only countably many computable functions. But can we computably enumerate
them?
LEMMA 1: (i) Let L ⊆ N and infinite. The computable positive probability mass functions on L are
not c.e..
(ii) Let L ⊆ N with |L| ≥ 2. The computable positive measures on L are not c.e..
PROOF. (i) Assume to the contrary that the lemma is false and the computable enumeration is p1, p2, . . . .
Compute a probability mass function p with p(a) 6= pi(ai) for ai ∈ L is the ith element of L as follows.
If i is odd then p(ai) := pi(ai) + pi(ai)pi+1(ai+1) and p(ai+1) := pi+1(ai+1) − pi(ai)pi+1(ai+1).
By construction p is a computable positive probability mass function but different from any pi in the
enumeration p1, p2, . . ..
(ii) The set L∗ is c.e.. Hence the set of cylinders in L∞ is c.e.. Therefore (ii) reduces to (i). •
REMARK 1: Every probability mass function is positive on some support L 6= ∅ and 0 otherwise.
Hence Lemma 1 holds for all probability mass functions. ✸
B. Kolmogorov Complexity
We need the theory of Kolmogorov complexity [42] (originally in [39] and the prefix version we use
here originally in [41]). A prefix Turing machine is a Turing machine with a one-way read-only input
tape with a distinguished tape cell called the origin, a finite number of two-way read-write working tapes
on which the computation takes place, an auxiliary tape on which the auxiliary string y ∈ {0, 1}∗ is
written, and a one-way write-only output tape. At the start of the computation the input tape is infinitely
inscribed from the origin onwards, and the input head is on the origin. The machine operates with a
binary alphabet. If the machine halts then the input head has scanned a segment of the input tape from
the origin onwards. We call this initial segment the program.
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By the construction above, for every auxiliary y ∈ {0, 1}∗, the set of programs is a prefix code: no
program is a proper prefix of any other program. Consider a standard enumeration of all prefix Turing
machines
T1, T2, . . . .
Let U denote a prefix Turing machine such that for every z, y ∈ {0, 1}∗ and i ≥ 1 we have U(i, z, y) =
Ti(z, y). That is, for each finite binary program z, auxiliary y, and machine index i ≥ 1, we have that
U ’s execution on inputs i and z, y results in the same output as that obtained by executing Ti on input
z, y. We call such a U a universal prefix Turing machine.
However, there are more ways a prefix Turing machine can simulate other prefix Turing machines. For
example, let U ′ be such that U ′(i, zz, y) = Ti(z, y) for all i and z, y, and U
′(p) = 0 for p 6= i, zz, y for
some i, z, y. Then U ′ is universal also. To distinguish machines like U with nonredundant input from
other universal machines, Kolmogorov [39] called them optimal.
Fix an optimal machine, say U . Define the conditional prefix Kolmogorov complexity K(x|y) for all
x, y ∈ {0, 1}∗ by K(x|y) = minp{|p| : p ∈ {0, 1}∗ andU(p, y) = x}. (Here U has two arguments rather
than three. We consider the first argument to encode the first two arguments of the previous three.) For
the same U , define the time-bounded conditional prefix Kolmogorov complexity Kt(x|y) = minp{|p| :
p ∈ {0, 1}∗ and U(p, y) = x in t steps}. To obtain the unconditional versions of the prefix Kolmogorov
complexities set y = ǫ where ǫ is the empty word (the word with no letters). It can be shown that K(x|y)
is incomputable [39]. Clearly Kt(x|y) is computable if t <∞. Moreover, Kt′(x|y) ≤ Kt(x|y) for every
t′ ≥ t, and limt→∞Kt(x|y) = K(x|y).
C. Measures and Computability
Let L ⊆ N . Given a finite sequence x = x1, x2, . . . , xn of elements of L, we consider the set of
infinite sequences starting with x. The set of all such sequences is written as Γx, the cylinder of x. We
associate a probability µ(Γx) with the event that an element of Γx occurs. Here we simplify the notation
µ(Γx) and write µ(x). The transitive closure of the intersection, complement, and countable union of
cylinders gives a set of subsets of L∞. The probabilities associated with these subsets are derived from
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the probabilities of the cylinders in standard ways [37]. A measure µ satisfies the following equalities:
µ(ǫ) = 1 (A.1)
µ(x) =
∑
a∈L
µ(xa).
Let x1, x2, . . . be an infinite sequence of elements of L. The sequence is typical for a computable measure
µ if it passes all computable sequential tests (known and unknown alike) for randomness with respect
to µ. These tests are formalized by Martin-Lo¨f [45]. One of the highlights of the theory of Martin-Lo¨f
is that the sequence passes all these tests iff it passes a single computable universal test, [42, Corollary
4.5.2 on p 315], see also [45].
DEFINITION 4: Let x1, x2, . . . be an infinite sequence of elements of L ⊆ N . The sequence is typical
or random for a computable measure µ iff
sup
n
{log 1
µ(x1 . . . xn)
−K(x1 . . . xn)} <∞. (A.2)
The set of infinite sequences that are typical with respect to a measure µ have µ-measure one. The theory
and properties of such sequences for computable measures are extensively treated in [42, Chapter 4].
There the term K(x1 . . . xn) in (A.2) is given as K(x1 . . . xn|µ). However, since µ is computable we
have K(µ) <∞ and therefore K(x1 . . . xn|µ) ≤ K(x1 . . . xn) +O(1).
EXAMPLE 6: Let k be a positive integer and fix an a ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Define measure µk by µk(ǫ) = 1 and
µk(x1 . . . xn) = 1/k for n ≥ 1 and xi = a for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and µk(x1 . . . xn) = (k−n− 1)(1− 1/k)
otherwise. Then K(a . . . a) (a sequence of n elements a) equals K(i, n) + O(1) = O(log n + log k).
(A sequence of n elements a is described by n in O(log n) bits and a in O(log k) bits.) By (A.2) we
have supn∈N {log 1/µk(a . . . a) − K(a . . . a)} < ∞. Therefore the infinite sequence a, a, . . . is typical
for every µk. However, the infinite sequence y1, y2, . . . is not typical for µk with yi ∈ {1, . . . , k} (i ≥ 1)
and yi 6= yi+1 for some i. Namely, supn∈N{1/µk(y1y2 . . . yn)−K(y1y2 . . . yn)} =∞. ♦
Since k can be any positive integer, the example shows that an infinite sequence of data can be typical
for more than one measure. Hence our task is not to identify a single computable measure according to
which the data sequence was generated as a typical sequence, but to identify a computable measure that
could have generated the data sequence as a typical sequence.
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D. Proofs of the Theorems
PROOF. OF THEOREM 1: I.I.D. COMPUTABLE PROBABILITY IDENTIFICATION. Let L ⊆ N , and
X1,X2, . . . be a sequence of mutually independent random variables, each of which is a copy of a
single random variable X with probability mass function P (X = a) = p(a) for a ∈ L. Without loss of
generality p(a) > 0 for all a ∈ L. Let #a(x1, x2, . . . , xn) denote the number of times xi = a (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
for some fixed a ∈ L.
CLAIM 1: If the outcomes of the random variables X1,X2, . . . are x1, x2, . . . , then almost surely for
all a ∈ L we have
lim
n→∞
(
p(a)− #a(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
n
)
= 0. (A.3)
PROOF. The strong law of large numbers (originally in [38], see also [37] and [8]) states that if we
perform the same experiment a large number of times, then almost surely the number of successes divided
by the number of trials goes to the expected value, provided the mean exists, see the theorem on top of
page 260 in [23]. To determine the probability of an a ∈ L we consider the random variables Xa with
just two outcomes {a, a¯}. This Xa is a Bernoulli process (qa, 1− qa) where qa = p(a) is the probability
of a and 1− qa =
∑
b∈L\{a} p(b) is the probability of a¯. If we set a¯ = min (L \ {a}), then the mean µa
of Xa is
µa = aqa + a¯(1− qa) ≤ max{a, a¯} <∞.
Thus, every a ∈ L incurs a random variableXa with a finite mean. Therefore, (1/n)
∑n
i=1(Xa)i converges
almost surely to qa as n→∞. The claim follows. •
Let A be a list of a c.e. or co-c.e. set of halting algorithms for the computable probability mass
functions. If q ∈ A and q = p then for every ǫ > 0 and a ∈ L holds p(a)− q(a) ≤ ǫ. By Claim 1, almost
surely
lim
n→∞
max
a∈L
(
qi(a)− #a(x1, x2, . . . , xn)
n
)
= 0. (A.4)
If q ∈ A and q 6= p then there is an a ∈ L and a constant δ > 0 such that |p(a)− q(a)| > δ. Again by
Claim 1, almost surely
lim
n→∞
max
a∈L
∣∣∣∣qi(a)− #a(x1, x2, . . . , xn)n
∣∣∣∣ > δ. (A.5)
In the proof [23, p. 204] of the strong law of large numbers it is shown that if we draw x1, x2, . . .
i.i.d. from a set L ⊆ N according to a probability mass function p then almost surely the size of the
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fluctuations in going to the limit (A.4) satisfies |np(a) −#a(x1, x2, . . . , xn)|/
√
np(a)p(a¯) <
√
2λ lg n
for every λ > 1 and n is large enough, for all a ∈ L. Here lg denotes the natural logarithm. Since
p(a)p(a¯) ≤ 1
4
and λ =
√
2 it suffices that |p(a)−#a(x1, x2, . . . , xn)/n| <
√
(lg n)/n for all but finitely
many n.
Let q ∈ A. For q 6= p there is an a ∈ L such that by (A.5) and the fluctuations in going to that limit we
have |q(a)−#a(x1, x2, . . . , xn)/n| > δ−
√
(lg n)/n for all but finitely many n. Since δ > 0 is constant,
we have 2
√
(lg n)/n < δ for all but finitely many n. Hence |q(a)−#a(x1, x2, . . . , xn)/n| >
√
(lg n)/n
for all but finitely many n.
Let A = q1, q2, . . . and p = qk with k least. We give an algorithm with as output a sequence of indexes
i1, i2, . . . such that all but finitely many indexes are k. If L = {a1, a2, . . .} is infinite then the algorithm
will only use a finite subset of it. Hence we need to define this finite subset and show that the remaining
elements can be ignored. Let An = {a ∈ L : #a(x1, x2, . . . , xn) > 0}. In case a ∈ L but a 6∈ An we
still have |qk(a)−#a(x1, x2, . . . , xn)/n| ≤
√
(lg n)/n for all but finitely many n.
Now define the following sets. For each qi ∈ A the set Bi,n = {a1, . . . , am} with m least such that∑∞
j=m+1 qi(aj) = 1−
∑m
j=1 qi(aj) <
√
1/n. Therefore, if a ∈ L \Bi,n then qi(a) <
√
1/n. In contrast
to the infinity of L the sets An and Bi,n are finite for all n and i.
Define Li,n = An
⋃
Bi,n. Since Li,n ⊆ L we have for every a ∈ Li,n that |qk(a) −
#a(x1, x2, . . . , xn)/n| ≤
√
(lg n)/n for all but finitely many n. However, for qi 6= qk there is an
a ∈ Li,n but no a ∈ L \ Li,n such that |qi(a) −#a(x1, x2, . . . , xn)/n| >
√
(lg n)/n for all but finitely
many n. This leads to the following algorithm with I the set of indexes of the elements in A:
for n := 1, 2, . . .
I := ∅; for i := 1, 2, . . . , n
if maxa∈Li,n |qi(a)−#a(x1, x2, . . . , xn)/n| <
√
(lg n)/n
then I := I
⋃{i};
in := min I
With probability 1 for every i < k for all but finitely many n we have i 6∈ I while k ∈ I for all but
finitely many n. (Note that for every n = 1, 2, . . . the main term in the above algorithm is computable
even if L is infinite.) The theorem is proven. •
PROOF. OF THEOREM 2 COMPUTABLE MEASURE IDENTIFICATION For the Kolmogorov complexity
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notions see Appendix B. For the theory of computable measures, see Appendix C. In particular we use
the criterion of Definition 4 in Appendix C to show that an infinite sequence is typical in Martin-Lo¨f’s
sense. The given data sequence x1, x2, . . . is by assumption typical for some computable measure µ in
a c.e. or co-c.e. set of computable measures and hence satisfies (A.2) with respect to µ. We stress that
the data sequence is possibly typical for different computable measures. Therefore we cannot speak of
the single true computable measure, but only of a computable measure for which the data is typical.
Let B be an enumeration of halting algorithms for a c.e. or co-c.e. set of computable measures such that
each element occurs infinitely many times in the list. If the enumeration is such that each element occurs
ony finitely many times, then the enumeration can be changed into one where each element occurs
infinitely many times. For instance, by repeating the first element after every position in the original
enumeration, repeating the second element in the original enumeration after every second position in the
resulting enumeration, and so on.
CLAIM 2: There is an algorithm with as input an enumeration B = µ1, µ2, . . . and as output a sequence
of indexes i1, i2, . . .. For every large enough n we have in = k with µk a computable measure for which
the data sequence is typical.
PROOF. Define for µ in B
σ(j) = log 1/µ(x1 . . . xj)−K(x1 . . . xj).
Since K is upper semicomputable and µ is computable, the function σ(j) is lower semicomputable for
each j. Define the nth value in the lower semicomputation of σ(j) as σn(j). By (A.2), the data sequence
x1, x2, . . . is typical for µ if supj≥1 σ(j) = σ < ∞ In this case, since µ is lower semicomputable,
max1≤j≤n σ
n(j) ≤ σ for all n. In contrast, the data sequence is not typical for µ if σ(n) → ∞ with
n→∞ implying σn(n)→∞ with n→∞.
By assumption there exists a measure in B for which the data sequence is typical. Let µh be such a
measure Since halting algorithms for µh occur infinitely often in the enumeration B there is a halting
algorithm µh′ in the enumeration B with σh′ = σh and σh < h′. Therefore, there exists a measure µk in
B for which the data sequence x1, x2, . . . is typical and σk < k with k least. The algorithm to determine
k is as follows.
for n := 1, 2, . . .
if i ≤ n is least such that max1≤j≤n σni (j) < i
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then output in = i else output in = 1.
Eventually max1≤j≤n σ
n
k (j) < k for large enough n, and k is the least index of elements in B for
which this holds. Hence there exists an n0 such that in = k for all n ≥ n0. •
For large enough n we have by Claim 2 a test such that we can identify in the limit an index of a
measure in B for which the provided data sequence is typical. Hence there is an n0 such that in = k for
all n ≥ n0. We do not care what i1, . . . , in−1 are. This proves the theorem. •
E. Genesis of the Result
At the request of a referee we give a brief account of the genesis of the result. In version
arXiv:1208.5003 we assumed that we were dealing with all computable probabilities and the necessary
extensions to measures. The first part of the technical results dealt with i.i.d drawing and ergodic Markov
chains. Here a main ingredient was to appeal to the known result that computable semiprobability mass
functions (those summing to 1 or less than 1) are computably enumerable in a linear list. By some tricks
we sought to computably extract the probabilities proper from among them and use the Law of Large
Numbers. For the more difficult dependent case we resorted to measures. Here we used a known result
that the computable semimeasures (where the equality signs in the measure conditions are replaced by
inequality ≤ signs) are computably enumerable as well in a linear list. Again we sought to computably
extract the measures proper from this list and use a (known) criterion that says that the measures for
which the provided infinite sequence of examples is random (typical) keeps a certain quantity finite. The
proof in arXiv:1208.5003 entailed to separate the finite sequences of this quantity from the infinite ones.
This took a long time and effort. Subsequently in [6] it was shown that the approach of arXiv:1208.5003
was in error: they showed by a very technical argument that identification of computable probabilities and
computable measures by infinite sequences of examples was impossible. Extensive email contact with one
of the authors, Laurent Bienvenu, showed that the essential point was the extraction of probabilities and
measures from the above computable enumerations of all computable semiprobabilities and computable
semimeasures. It turned out that we required computable enumerations or co-computable enumerations of
computable probabilities and computable measures at the outset. This was done in arXiv:1311.7385. That
is, the identification does not hold for all computable probabilities and computable measures as in the
too large claims of arXiv:1208.5003 but for the subclass of computable enumerations or co-computable
enumerations of them. Furthermore the very difficult argument separating bounded infinite sequences
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from unbounded ones (in the dependent case) was replaced by a simple one reminiscent of the h-index
in citation science. Namely, a bounded infinite sequence has a(n unknown) bound. But if the measures
involved are enumerated then eventually the index of one (there are infinitely many of them) for which
the bound is relevant will pass this bound.
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